



Comparing the Performance of Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) vs. eXtensible Markup Language (XML)

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Thanks to:

EPSRC

Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council

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Agenda

- Motivation
- Introduction to
 - ASN.1
 - XML
- Testing Technology Used
- Performance Measurements
- Results
- Conclusions

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Motivation

- We have built an Electronic Transfer of Prescriptions system, in which prescriptions are transferred as digitally signed X.509 attribute certificates
- The system must be fast, especially for pharmacists who can currently process paper prescriptions in 30 seconds
- The UK Dept of Health has specified electronic prescriptions in XML format, so we wanted to know the implications of this from a performance perspective

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Introduction to Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) (1)

- Designed to describe the structure and syntax of transmitted information content
- Provides for the definition of the abstract syntax of a data element (or data type)
- The language is based firmly on the principles of type and value, with a type being a (non-empty) set of values
- e.g. **AllowedAccess ::= BOOLEAN**
- The type defines what values can subsequently be sent at runtime, and the value is what is actually conveyed across the medium at runtime according to specified encoding rules

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Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) (2)

- Standard encoding rules
 - Basic Encoding Rules (BER)
 - Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)
 - Packed Encoding Rules (PER)
 - XML Encoding Rules (XER)
- During the transmission the ASN.1 data stream is never in a form readable by human operators
- Only when it has been transformed into some local data display format, prior to encoding or after decoding, can it be easily read by humans.

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Introduction to eXtensible Markup Language (XML) (1)

- Set of rules that allows data values to be encoded in text format
- Subset of the Standard Generalized Markup Language (SGML), but is also infinitely extensible
- Contains the information for transmission and consists of markup and character data
- Constraints can be imposed on the XML document structure with the provision of Document Type Definitions (DTD's) or XML Schemas
- Major backing from Sun, IBM, Microsoft etc.

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Introduction to eXtensible Markup Language (XML) (2)

- E.g. `<!ELEMENT allowedAccess (#PCDATA)>`
`<allowedAccess>TRUE</allowedAccess>`
- XML is very verbose, and consequently creates large data streams
- XML is transferred in textual format with no binary encodings or compression
- the recipient has to examine every byte received in order to determine the end of a data value
- DTD's / schemas map to the abstract syntax type definitions within ASN.1

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Testing Technology Used

- Java - IBM JDK (Suganuma et al, “Overview of the IBM Java Just-in-Time Compiler”, See <http://www.research.ibm.com/journal/sj/391/suganuma.html>)
- Hardware - CPU: P3 650MHz, 256Mbytes memory
- Operating System - RedHat Linux
- System measurement code written in C using libgtop.

Measures

- User mode CPU utilisation
- System mode CPU utilisation
- Total number of pages in memory
- Number of minor and major page faults

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Technology Used - Attribute Certificates

- The DOH has issued a number of DTD's describing the expected structure of all electronic prescriptions
- No definition for an attribute certificate in XML and there is equally no definition of the DOH prescription structures in ASN.1
- We generated these structures using our knowledge of ASN.1 and XML and taking into account the existing XML definitions for public key certificates and signatures
- Used DER encoding within our application to generate the encoded ASN.1 certificates

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Testing Application

- System Operation with no security
 - attribute certificate is created by the client and then transmitted to the server using standard sockets
 - The recipient parses it into a data structure for easy access to any of its data elements
- Secure System Operation
 - attribute certificate is created by the client, digitally signed, and then transmitted to the server using standard sockets
 - The recipient firstly verifies the signature and then parses the certificate into a data structure for easy access to any of its data elements
- Used 3 complexities of attribute certificate
 - Very Complex – auditCertificate (defined in a previous research project)
 - Semi-Complex – etpPrescribe certificate (defined by Dept of Health)
 - Simple – boolean attribute value

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Performance Measurements

- Performance measurements made on a single machine
- Following measurements taken:
 - CPU ticks for attribute certificate construction and verification
 - Process memory use for structure construction
 - Number of page faults (minor and major) for structure construction and verification
 - The size in bytes of the completed certificates
 - The size in bytes of the zipped certificates
 - Elapsed time for construction and verification
- Tests repeated 100 times to allow for statistical variations in the results

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Size Comparison (bytes)

	ASN.1 Unsigned	DOM XML Unsigned	Zipped XML Unsigned	ASN.1 Signed	DOM XML Signed	Zipped XML Signed
Simple Attribute	235	2880	710	384	3704	913
Semi-Complex	944	6210	1532	1060	7043	1737
Complex Attribute	1351	18297	4514	1483	19184	4733

**Conclusion: XML creates data blocks approximately
an order of magnitude greater than BER encoded
ASN.1**

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Theoretical Transmission Times over a 64kbps / 256 kbps link (ms)

	ASN.1 Unsigned	DOM XML Unsigned	ASN.1 Signed	DOM XML Signed
Simple Attribute	29 / 7	352 / 88	47 / 12	452 / 113
Semi-Complex	115 / 29	758 / 190	129 / 32	860 / 215
Complex Attribute	165 / 41	2234 / 558	181 / 45	2342 / 585

Conclusion. Broadband is needed for pharmacist's shops

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Sender Encoding Times of Unsigned Data (ms)

	ASN.1	DOM XML	Comparison XML/ASN.1
Simple Attribute	6.83	2.66	-60%
Semi-Complex	8.98	4.46	-50%
Complex Attribute	10.54	14.88	40%

Conclusion. ASN.1 has a larger initialisation time, but is faster encoding each data item

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Recipient Decoding Times of Unsigned Data (ms)

	ASN.1	DOM XML	Comparison XML/ASN.1
Simple Attribute	1.63	4.46	170%
Semi-Complex	2.49	5.5	120%
Complex Attribute	3.52	9.07	157%

Conclusion. XML takes much longer to decode each value due to having to parse each character

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Sender Signing and Encoding Times (ms)

	ASN.1	DOM XML	Comparison XML/ASN.1
Simple Attribute	94.82	113.36	20%
Semi-Complex	100.28	125.85	26%
Complex Attribute	102.79	184.12	80%

Conclusion. XML signing takes much longer per data item

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Recipient Signature Validation and Decoding Times (ms)

	ASN.1	DOM XML	Comparison XML/ASN.1
Simple Attribute	5.92	26.62	350%
Semi-Complex	6.01	38.96	550%
Complex Attribute	6.16	67.22	1000%

**Conclusion. Double whammy on XML.
Slow validation and slow decoding**

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Other Results

- In secure operations ASN.1 requires lower CPU user time than XML for both sender and recipient for all attribute complexities
- The system time required by XML in almost every case was more than the system time required for ASN.1
- Without the overhead of security XML required lower amounts of dynamic memory allocation than ASN.1
 - ASN.1 requires a large number of class instantiations and ultimately destructions, whereas the XML application uses fewer classes and therefore has lower initial memory requirements

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Conclusions

- In environments where simple XML messages are required without secure operations then XML performs adequately
- For critical real time systems where digital signing of complex data structures is required, and where performance is a key success factor, such as in an electronic prescribing system, signed complex XML messages can be up to a 1000% slower to decode than an equivalent ASN.1 message
- We believe that in a real time system dealing in multiple transactions a second and requiring strong authentication through digital signatures, XML formatting is not a good protocol to choose

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Questions



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